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Abstract: 
 
We explore the relationship between risk preference and the level of unsecured debt at the household level 
within the context of a two period theoretical framework, which predicts that debt is a function of risk 
aversion. We test the predictions of our theoretical framework for a sample of households drawn from the 
U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Using a 
sequence of questions from the 1996 PSID and the 1989 to 2004 SCF, we construct measures of risk 
preference allowing us to explore the implications of interpersonal differences in risk preference for the 
accumulation of unsecured debt at the household level. Our empirical findings, which accord with our 
theoretical priors, suggest that risk preference is an important determinant of the level of unsecured debt 
acquired at the household level with risk aversion serving to reduce the level of unsecured debt 
accumulated by households.  
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I. Introduction 
Both sides of the Atlantic have witnessed a massive increase in consumer debt over the 
last decade. For the US, recent figures from the Federal Reserve reveal that debt levels 
(consumer credit and mortgage debt) were nearly $11,804 billion by the end of 2005 
(Federal Reserve, 2007). Despite such figures, amongst academic economists research 
into the determinants of debt at the household level is surprisingly scarce. This is 
somewhat puzzling as the most common reasons for debt problems, which include 
income shocks and unemployment, are active areas of research in the economics 
literature.  
There are, however, a small number of empirical studies on debt, which explore 
its determinants at the household or individual level. For example, Godwin (1997) 
explores the dynamics of households’ use of consumer credit and attitudes towards 
credit using U.S. panel data. The findings suggest that there was considerable mobility 
in debt status during the 1980s, with the majority of households in a different debt 
quintile in 1989 relative to 1983. In a more recent U.S. study, Crook (2001) explores the 
factors that explain U.S. household debt over the period 1990 to 1995 using data from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances and finds that income, home ownership and family 
size all impact positively on the level of household debt; whilst Brown et al. (2005) 
conduct empirical analysis based on British panel data and find that financial 
expectations are important determinants of unsecured debt at the individual and the 
household level.  
In this paper, we focus on one particular influence on debt accumulation at the 
household level, namely risk preference. Given the uncertainty surrounding the capacity 
to acquire and repay debt it is surprising that inter-personal differences in risk 
preferences have not attracted much attention in the empirical literature on household 
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debt.1 Households generally acquire debt to increase current consumption with 
repayments being made in the future. Typically, this may be due to life cycle reasons, 
short term liquidity constraints or other market imperfections. Given that debt 
repayments are generally financed from household income, it is apparent that if income 
in the future is subject to risk (such as redundancy, unemployment or changes in real 
wages), then the risk preference of the individual will potentially play a key role in the 
decision to acquire debt, given the distribution of future income and interest rates. 
Intuitively, one might predict that the more risk averse an individual is, the lower will be 
the debt he/she incurs if there is a non zero probability that the individual cannot repay 
the debt in the future.  
From a theoretical perspective, the issue of how consumers with different risk 
preferences choose an optimal level of debt cannot be analysed separately from the 
saving decision. One puzzle in consumer behaviour concerns why households borrow 
and save at the same time. Four possible explanations are given. Firstly, if, in a world of 
certainty, the return on saving is above that on borrowing then it is in the consumer’s 
interest to borrow to the maximum extent possible, and save some of the debt thus 
raised. Secondly, some forms of saving and borrowing are for prescribed purposes. For 
example, some borrowing channels are restricted to financing certain types of 
expenditure over a fixed medium term period, such as, for example, a 5 year loan for a 
home appliance with no prepayment option, or ‘zero interest’ catalogue purchases. In 
this case, we could observe individuals with such loans who are also saving in response 
to short run favourable income shocks. Thirdly, a pure liquidity reason may determine 
short term simultaneous savings and debt. In other words, there may be no fundamental 
reason to save or borrow, but the potentially unmatched timing of income and outgoings 
                                                 
1 One exception lies in the economic psychology literature: Donkers and Van Soest (1999) find that risk 
averse Dutch homeowners tend to live in houses with lower mortgages. 
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means that a household has both debt and savings over a period of time. Finally, in a 
world of uncertainty over interest rates and labour income, an individual may both 
borrow and save in order to diversify his/her financial portfolio. Consider a household in 
a long term debt position, such as a young household with rising mean income 
expectations that engages in debt to finance consumption (for example, of a durable 
good), while facing risk in future income and interest rates. In these circumstances, if 
there is positive correlation between interest rates on debt, interest rates on savings and 
future income, then the more risk averse the household, the more it will attempt to hedge 
its risks on future debt and income by saving. In the present example with positive 
correlation between rates of interest and income, the risk on future income is an outside 
risk, but the household can control its choice of both debt and savings as financial 
instruments. Hence, a risk averse individual may be observed both borrowing and saving 
at the same time.   
Without risk aversion or market imperfections (such as credit tied to goods 
purchase), the only motivation for joint borrowing and savings is to make money if, on 
average, the savings rate is above the borrowing rate. But with risk aversion, in the 
presence of uncertain future income and interest rate streams, the nature of an 
individual’s risk preference will play an important role in the decision to use debt in 
order to finance current consumption. From the theoretical point of view, there is a vast 
literature on precautionary savings that has analysed the role of risk preferences in life 
cycle decisions. In a portfolio context, savings can also be used to hedge against outside 
risk and against the risk on debt itself, as discussed above. However, in the context of 
empirical analysis, there are obvious problems in measuring risk preferences at the 
household or individual level. Consequently, the role played by attitudes towards risk in 
personal financial decisions has attracted somewhat limited attention in the empirical 
 5
literature.2  In order to redress this imbalance in the existing economics literature, we 
aim to explore the relationship between risk preference and unsecured debt in the 
presence of savings from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.  
 
II. Theoretical Background 
We can capture the influences on borrowing and saving described above within a simple 
life cycle example, which serves to inform our subsequent empirical analysis. We aim to 
derive closed form solutions for optimal borrowing and saving, so we use a mean-
variance specification for the utility function.3 This can be regarded as an approximation 
to an underlying more general utility function. In this case, with a finite life, the value 
function is also mean-variance in disposable resources. Hence, if we restrict attention to 
a two period problem, our asset behaviour will conveniently reflect that same problem 
for a multi-period horizon. 
There are two assets:  is the stock of the savings asset, which has a gross 
return of ; and  is the stock of debt, which has a gross cost of . The 
individual has labour income of  in periods 
0≥S
SR 0≥D DR
ty 2,1=t  and starts life with given stocks, 
 and . So in period 1, disposable resources, , are given by: 1S 1D 1w
111111 DRSRyw DS −+=              (1)  
These resources are used in period 1 for either consumption or net financial asset 
holding, so that the budget constraint for period 1 is given by: 
2211 DScw −+=               (2) 
Since period 2 is the final period, all available resources are then consumed: 
                                                 
2 Exceptions can be found in the experimental and behavioural economics literature, see for example, 
Thaler and Sheffrin (1981), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Benhabib and Bisin (2005). 
3 With a general utility function the coefficient of risk aversion will be a function of current and future 
consumption so that risk preferences will then depend on current and future consumption and its 
determinants. 
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2222222 DRSRywc DS −+==             (3) 
In period 1, the labour income and the interest rates of period 2 are unknown and have a 
joint probability distribution. Utility in each period is denoted by:4
( ) 2,1);var(
2
=−= tcbEccu ttt                  (4) 
which is discounted at rate, β . Hence, the trade-off between the mean and variance of 
consumption is given by: 
( )[ ] [ ]
( )[ ] ( ) bccuE
cEcuE
tt
tt 2
var/
/ =∂∂
∂∂−                   (5) 
where  is the coefficient of risk aversion, i.e. the focus of our paper. The 
individual’s choice problem is as follows: 
( 2/b )
0,
.
)var(
2
max
22
2211
222222
221,, 221
≥
−+=
−+=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+
DS
DScw
DRSRycst
cbEcc
DS
DSc
β
            (6) 
 Since the individual will always consume all initial wealth over his/her lifetime, we can 
use the first period budget constraint to eliminate , yielding:  1c
0,
.
)var(
2
 max
22
222222
22221, 22
≥
−+=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−
DS
DRSRycst
cbEcDSw
DS
DS
β
            (7) 
Let Sµ , Dµ  and yµ  denote the means of second period interest rates and labour income 
respectively; and let:  
                                                 
4 First period utility is linear in first period consumption because during the initial period income is certain 
and consequently has zero variance. If first period utility were quadratic in consumption, then income 
would enter the expressions for optimal debt and savings. However, the inter-temporal rate of substitution, 
equation (5), would no longer be equal to the risk preference parameter itself, but to the risk preference 
parameter plus expected consumption. For this reason, we have adopted a mean-variance specification. 
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denote the variance-covariance matrix of these variables. Using the definition of  
given by equation (3), problem (7) becomes: 
2c
0,.
)222(
2
max
22
2222
2
2
2
222
2212,2
≥
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+++−−+
++−
DSst
DSDSDSbDS
DSw
SDyDySDDSSyyDSy
DS
σσσσσσµµµβ       
(9) 
with interior solution: 
( bBAD DD /2222 += )
)
             (10) 
( bBAS SS /2222 +=             (11) 
where: 
( )( )22 SDDDSS ySSDyDSSDA σσσ
σσσσ
−
−=            (12) 
( )( )22 )1()1( SDDDSS SSDDSSDB σσσβ
βµσβµσ
−
−−−=          (13) 
( )( )22 SDDDSS DDySyDSDSA σσσ
σσσσ
−
−=              (14) 
( )( )22 )1()1( SDDDSS DSDSDDSB σσσβ
βµσβµσ
−
−+−−=          (15) 
Equations (12) to (15) have a common denominator, 2
SDDDSS σσσ − , which is equal to 
one minus the correlation coefficient between interest rates, savings and debt, multiplied 
by the product of the corresponding variances. In equations (13) and (15) in particular, 
the numerator represents the hedging component. For example, if 0=SDσ , then 
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equations (13) and (15) reduce to the expected returns on debt and savings,  ( ) 
and 
Dβµ−1
(1 S )βµ− , divided by the deflation for risk and time preference; whereas if 
0≠SDσ  then hedging between savings and debt occurs. On the other hand, the possible 
corner solutions of problem (9) are as follows: { }0,0 22 >= DS , { }0,0 22 => DS  and 
. In order to analyse the relationship between debt and risk preference, 
we will briefly comment on the corner solutions below, beginning with the 
 corner, which occurs when the lifetime marginal expected payoff of 
savings is negative evaluated at zero savings. In this corner solution case, the optimal 
level of debt is given by: 
{ 0,0 22 == DS }
}{ 0,0 22 >= DS
DD
Dy
DD
D
b
D σ
σ
βσ
βµ +−= )1(22            (16) 
so long as the following inequality is satisfied: 
[ )1()1(2)( DSDSDDySDDSDyD b βµσβµσσσσσβ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛<− ]       (17) 
There are two points particularly worthy of note here. Firstly, with mean-variance utility 
the variance of future labour income, yyσ , acts as a deadweight loss: utility is lower the 
higher the variance of income, but the impact of the variance cannot be reduced through 
debt or saving. Hence, for all types of solution (whether interior or corner), yyσ  does not 
appear in the debt or savings equations. Secondly, equation (17) is the condition for a 
corner solution with no savings. It indicates that the first order condition for savings is 
strictly negative when debt is set at its optimal value given by equation (16). The left-
hand side of equation (17) represents the discounted relative covariance of debt rates 
with savings rates and income; whereas the right-hand side represents the difference in 
the expected returns on debt and savings, weighted by the corresponding covariances.  If 
this condition restricting the covariances is satisfied, then the marginal return on savings 
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is negative when savings is equal to zero, and the effect of risk preference on debt 
depends only on the mean; that is, on the sign of ( )Dβµ−1 , which, in turn, depends on 
the relative magnitude of expected borrowing rates, Dµ , with respect to the time 
preference parameter, β . For example, if βµ /1<D  then the expected return on debt is 
negative,  is positive, and debt is increasing in ( Dβµ−1 ) ( )b/2 , i.e. decreasing in risk 
aversion. Also, note the effect of the covariance between debt and income on the optimal 
size of debt: in equation (16), if 0>yDσ , then the consumer will take on more debt, 
since when the interest rate on debt is high, income will also be high, so the consumer 
can afford to repay more debt. 
 In the corner solution case with zero debt, the optimal level of savings is given 
by: 
SS
yS
SS
S
b
S σ
σ
βσ
βµ −−= )1(22            (18) 
so long as  the following inequality is satisfied: 
[ )1()1(2)( SSDDSSyDSSSDyS b βµσβµσσσσσβ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛>− ]        (19) 
Here the interpretation is analogous to that of the zero savings corner: again the effect of 
risk preference on savings depends on its mean return, once the condition on the 
covariances determined by equation (19) is satisfied. In this case, the marginal return on 
debt is negative at zero debt, and a positive covariance between savings interest rates 
and income will result in lower savings at the optimum. 
To summarise, equations (10), (13) and (16) show that the optimally chosen 
stock of debt is a linear function of the coefficient of risk aversion. In the interior 
solution case, the sign of equation (13) determines whether debt is increasing in , 
i.e. decreasing in risk aversion; in the corner solution cases this role is played by the sign 
( )b/2
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of the expected return on debt. Identical considerations can be made for the optimal 
savings equations (11), (15) and (18). Inequalities (17) and (19) serve to determine 
whether a corner solution with zero savings or with zero debt, respectively, is optimal.   
In sum, the analysis of the set of potential solutions – interior and corner – 
presented above indicates that risk preference, i.e. the parameter b, plays an important 
role in determining debt as well as saving at the household level. In the remaining 
empirical sections of the paper, we focus on the relationship between unsecured debt and 
risk preference at the household level: firstly, to explore whether our theoretical 
prediction that debt is influenced by risk preference is supported from an empirical 
perspective; and, secondly, to determine the nature of this relationship. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
Measurement of Risk Preference 
The obvious problem with exploring the relationship between household debt and risk 
preference from an empirical perspective lies in locating a suitable measure of risk 
preference. For this purpose, we exploit data from two U.S. surveys: the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a representative panel of individuals ongoing since 
1968 conducted at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan; and the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a cross-section survey of the balance 
sheet, pension, income, demographic characteristics and use of financial institutions of 
U.S. families developed since 1983 by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.5
The PSID 1996 Survey includes a Risk Aversion Section which contains detailed 
information on individuals’ attitudes towards risk. The Risk Aversion Section contains 
five questions related to hypothetical gambles with respect to lifetime income. To be 
                                                 
5 Chatterjee et al. (2007) calibrate their general equilibrium model characterised by unsecured consumer 
credit and risk of default using data on debt and default from the PSID and SCF. 
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specific, all heads of household were asked the following question (M1): Suppose you 
had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current total income. And 
that job was (your/your family’s) only source of income. Then you are given the 
opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double 
your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your 
income and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?6  The individuals 
who answered ‘yes’ to this question, were then asked (M2): Now, suppose the chances 
were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would 
cut it in half. Would you still take the job? Those individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this 
question were then asked (M5): Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new 
job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 75%. Would 
you still take the new job? Individuals who answered ‘no’ to Question M1 were asked 
(M3): Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your 
(family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent. Then would you take the 
job? Those individuals who replied ‘no’ were asked (M4): Now, suppose that the 
chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that 
it would cut it by 10 percent. Then would you take the new job?  
 We use the responses to this series of questions to create a six point risk aversion 
index for the head of household h, hRA  as follows: 
0 1 & 2 & 5 7.23%
1 1 & 2 & 5 12.89%
2 1 & 2 15.66%
3 1 & 3 14.48%
4 1 & 3 & 4 18.87%
5 1 & 3 & 4 30.51%
h
if M Yes M Yes M Yes
if M Yes M Yes M No
if M Yes M No
RA
if M No M Yes
if M No M No M Yes
if M No M No M No
= = =⎧⎪ = = =⎪⎪ = == ⎨ = =⎪⎪ = = =⎪ = = =⎩
      (20) 
                                                 
6 As Luoh and Stafford (2005) point out, it is important to acknowledge that the question states that the 
new job will be ‘equally as good’ such that there is no difference in the non monetary characteristics of 
the jobs. Without such a qualification, individuals may be less willing to accept the gamble if there are 
non monetary attachments to their current job (Barsky et al., 1997).  
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where the percentages of individuals in each category are also shown. The sample, 
comprising 2,560 observations, relates to all heads of household aged 18 or over in 
1996. Thus, the index is increasing in risk aversion such that if an individual rejects all 
the hypothetical gambles offered, the risk aversion index takes the highest value of 5, 
whilst if the individual accepts all gambles offered the risk aversion index takes the 
value of zero. It is interesting to note the low (high) percentage of respondents with the 
lowest (highest) value of the risk aversion index. Intermediate cases lie in between these 
two extreme values such that individuals are ranked according to their reluctance to 
accept the hypothetical gambles. The series of questions, thus, enables us to place 
individuals into one of six categories of risk aversion. Furthermore, as stated by Barsky 
et al. (1997), who find that this risk preference measure does predict actual risky 
behaviour such as smoking, drinking alcohol, not having insurance, choosing risky 
employment and holding risky financial assets, ‘the categories can be ranked by risk 
aversion without having to assume a particular form for the utility function,’ p.540. 
 With respect to the SCF, in  the 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 cross-
sectional surveys, individuals are asked: which of the following statements comes closest 
to the describing the amount of financial risk that you are willing to take when you save 
or make investments? Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial 
returns; Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns; 
Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns; Or not willing to take 
any financial risks. The responses to this question thus enable us to categorise 
individuals according to their attitude towards taking financial risks, with those 
individuals who indicate that they are not willing to take any financial risks being the 
most risk averse.7 We are thus able to construct an alternative measure of risk preference 
                                                 
7 Shaw (1996), who explores the relationship between income growth and risk aversion, bases her 
empirical measure of risk aversion on the above SCF question. 
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thereby enabling us to explore the robustness of our empirical findings. We use the 
responses to the SCF question to create a four point risk aversion index: 
0 5.38%
1 1
2
3
ht
Take substantial financial risks for substantial returns
Take above average financial risks for above average returns
RA
Take average financial risks for average returns
Not willing to take any financial risks
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
.35%
40.91%
34.36%
9
 
              (21) 
The sample relates to heads of household aged 18 and over in the 1989, 1992, 1995, 
1998, 2001 and 2004 SCFs, comprising 123,070 observations. It is interesting to note 
the similar percentage across both surveys, which characterises the least (most) risk 
averse category at around 5-7% (30-34%). 
The Measurement of Unsecured Debt and Financial Assets 
Detailed information pertaining to unsecured debt is available in the PSID for 1984, 
1989, 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2003, although the Risk Aversion Section is only available 
in the 1996 PSID. In each of these years, the head of household is asked the following 
question: Aside from the debts that we have already talked about, like any mortgage on 
your main home or vehicle loans, do you (or anyone in your family) currently have any 
other debts such as for credit card charges, student loans, medical or legal bills, or on 
loans from relatives? If you added up all of these debts (for all of your family), about 
how much would they amount to right now? Thus, the responses to this question yield 
information pertaining to the level of unsecured debt at the household level at time t, 
which is denoted by . In the SCF, unsecured debt ( ) is the summation of the 
outstanding balances on: credit cards and charge cards; and the outstanding balances on 
other consumer loans (such as loans for household appliances, furniture, hobby or 
recreational equipment, medical bills, loans from friends or relatives, loans for a 
business or investment or other loans).  
htd htd
 14
 In the theoretical framework presented in Section II, we analyse the relationship 
between debt and risk preference in the presence of savings, i.e. the household’s 
financial assets. Hence, it is important to incorporate financial assets in our econometric 
analysis. For both the PSID and the SCF we are able to measure the level of household 
financial assets. To be specific, for the PSID, the head of family is asked to specify the 
amount of shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, investment trusts, 
money in current (i.e. checking) or savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of 
deposit, and government savings bonds or treasury bills. Similarly, for the SCF 
individuals are asked to specify the monetary value of checking accounts, mutual funds, 
money market funds, government savings bonds and other types of asset. We then 
aggregate across the individuals within the family to obtain a measure at the household 
level at time t of financial assets, which is denoted by . hta
 For the PSID our sample is restricted to all heads of household aged 18 or over. 
We analyse an unbalanced panel of data drawn from the 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001 
and 2003 waves with risk preferences, which are only measured at 1996, being time 
invariant in the panel. The panel data set comprises 14,329 observations where 87% of 
individuals are in the sample for the entire period.8 For the SCF we analyse a pooled 
cross-section data set, which combines cross-sections for individuals in the 1989, 1992, 
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 surveys comprising total observations of 123,070. One 
advantage with the SCF is that the risk preference question is included in each of these 
cross-sections.  
Methodology 
                                                 
8 The minimum (maximum) number of times an individual is in the PSID is 3 (6) times. The mean of the 
risk aversion index does not differ significantly by the number of times an individual is in the panel, i.e. 
the hypothesis that the mean of the risk aversion index does not differ by the number of times the 
individual is in the sample cannot be rejected at the 1 per cent level. In addition, our results are robust to 
analysing a balanced panel. 
 15
Given that  cannot be negative, it is treated as a censored variable in our econometric 
analysis. Since the distribution of debt is highly skewed, we specify a logarithmic 
dependent variable following Gropp et al. (1997). Note, that for households reporting 
zero debt,  is recoded to zero, as there is no reported debt between zero and 
unity in either the PSID or the SCF. Following Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), we 
employ a censored regression model to ascertain the determinants of , which 
allows for the truncation of the dependent variable. Over time, both data sets reveal that 
around 45% of households do not have any unsecured debt where the median amount of 
debt is $500 and $300, for the PSID and SCF respectively.
htd
(ln htd )
)
)
                                                
(ln htd
9 In Figures 1A and 1B, the 
distributions of log debt for those heads of household with positive amounts of debt, i.e. 
, are shown for the PSID and SCF respectively. The distributions are similar, 
although debt in the SCF appears to be skewed towards the upper end of the distribution, 
with the median levels of debt being $6,500 and $4,000 in the PSID and SCF 
respectively.  
( )ln 0htd >
As indicated in the theoretical analysis presented in Section II, debt and financial 
assets represent two components of the household’s financial portfolio. Hence, arguably 
when exploring the factors that influence debt, financial liabilities and assets should be 
modelled simultaneously, see Brown and Taylor (2008). Whilst household debt remains 
our primary interest, employing a bivariate tobit model allows for the possibility of 
inter-dependent decision-making with respect to financial assets and liabilities by 
specifically jointly modelling both liabilities and assets. Financial assets are also defined 
as a logarithmic variable, , for the same reasons which apply to debt, as (ln hta
 
9 All monetary variables have been deflated with 2004 as the base year. 
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explained above. The bivariate tobit model is specified as follows where we pool over 
time: 
( ) 1 2 1ln *ht ht ht htd β X RA    β ε′= + +           (22) 
( ) ( )* *ln  ln 0ht ht htd d if d= >
ise
          (23) 
( )ln   0htd otherw=           (24) 
( ) 1 2 2ln *ht ht ht hta X RA    γ γ ε′= + +           (25) 
( ) ( )* *ln  ln 0ht ht hta a if a= >          (26) 
( )ln   0hta otherw= ise           (27) 
where the debts (assets) of household h are given by  ( ) such that h=1,…,nhtd hta h, htX  
denotes a vector of head of household and household characteristics, some of which are 
time invariant, year binary indicators, and 1htε  and 2htε  are the stochastic disturbance 
terms, ( 2 21 2 1 2, ~ 0,0, , ,ht ht ht htN )ε ε σ σ ρ , where the covariance is given by 
1 ,2 1 2ht ht ht htσ ρσ σ= . In the bivariate tobit model, the disturbance terms, 1htε  and 2htε , 
are jointly normally distributed with variances 1htσ  and 2htσ . If the correlation term, ρ , 
is zero, then assets and debt are independent. If 0≠ρ , then this implies a degree of 
inter-dependence between  and . The bivariate approach is particularly interesting 
in that it encompasses all of the scenarios analysed in the theoretical section, i.e. the 
corner and the interior solutions.
htd hta
10
                                                 
10 In the PSID (SCF), the percentage of households with  and , i.e. the interior solution in 
the theoretical framework presented in Section II, is 46.56% (22.73%); turning to the three possible corner 
solutions, the percentage of households with 
0hta > 0htd >
0hta =  and  is 8.78% (29.85%); the percentage of 
households  and  is 30.45% (29.56%); finally, the percentage of households with  
and  is 14.21% (17.85%). 
0htd >
0hta > 0htd = 0hta =
0htd =
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 The estimated coefficient 2β  serves to inform us about the relationship between 
the level of unsecured debt and risk preference at the household level. In our set of 
explanatory variables, we include controls for a number of influences which may affect 
the level of unsecured debt at the household level. Such controls include the following 
head of household characteristics: a quadratic in age; gender; ethnicity; marital status; 
whether the head of household is currently employed; whether the head of household’s 
spouse is employed; whether the head of household owns a business; education; and 
whether the head of household has reported good health over the past 12 months. 
Household controls include: household size; household income (earned, other non 
labour income and wealth);11 and housing tenure. Table 1 presents summary statistics 
for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
IV. Results 
The Determinants of Unsecured Debt 
As described above, the bivariate tobit specifications conveniently encompass both the 
interior and corner solutions from our theoretical framework. The results from 
estimating the bivariate tobit models for both the PSID and SCF are shown in Tables 2 
and 3 respectively, where the debt equation is reported in the first column and the 
financial asset equation in the second column. Panel A includes the risk aversion index, 
as defined above, which is increasing in risk aversion. It is apparent from Tables 2 and 3 
Panel A that the risk aversion index is negatively related to debt for both the PSID and 
the SCF, consistent with the theoretical prediction that debt is a function of risk 
preference. For all specifications, marginal effects are reported, which are calculated by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient through by the scaling factor: 
                                                 
11 The definition of wealth includes the net value of property (i.e. the current value minus any outstanding 
mortgage) and businesses. 
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{ }( )1 2 2/ht htβ X RAβ σ β′Φ + Φ,  denotes the cumulative distribution of the standard 
normal, where an approximation to the scaling factor, { }( )1 2 /ht htβ X RAβ σ′Φ + , is the 
proportion of uncensored observations. Focusing on the marginal effect relating to the 
risk preference measure, to ascertain the association with household debt, the marginal 
effect is multiplied through by the standard deviation of the index. The standard 
deviation of htRA  for the PSID (SCF) is 1.6404 (0.8664), hence, the impact of a one 
standard deviation increase in the risk aversion index is 17.37 (11.59) percentage points.  
Thus, the effect of risk aversion upon the level of debt over the time period appears to be 
relatively large. Interestingly, risk preference has no significant impact upon financial 
assets for the PSID and a small negative influence for the SCF.12,13 In terms of our 
theoretical analysis, these findings suggest that the magnitudes of equations (13) and 
(15) differ.    
Turning briefly to the other head of household characteristics, a number of 
additional common findings are found across the two data sets. Log debt is increasing 
in: age albeit at a decreasing rate; having an employed spouse; and education. Male 
heads of household, non-white heads of household and heads of household in good 
health are all inversely associated with the level of debt. Similarly, there is general 
consensus in the findings related to household characteristics. Total household labour 
                                                 
12 It should be acknowledged that the tobit estimator is sensitive to the presence of non-spherical 
disturbances, i.e. specifically heteroscedasticity and non-normality, which, if present, render the tobit 
estimates inconsistent. Hence, the specification is tested for non-spherical disturbances by comparing the 
tobit results to those from a Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimator via a Hausman test, 
where CLAD estimates are consistent and are not dependent upon assumptions of homoscedasticity and 
normality, see Powell (1984). The results of the Hausman test suggest that non normality and 
heteroscedasticity are not problematic since the null hypothesis that the tobit estimator is consistent and 
efficient cannot be rejected. Hausman tests were also conducted on the specifications which follow, where 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
13 We have explored the implications of selection bias via a simultaneous equation specification for 
strictly positive values of debt and financial assets, which should be inconsistent in the presence of 
selection bias. These estimates were compared to the bivariate tobit specification where we test for 
consistency via a Hausman test. The results confirm the consistency of the bivariate tobit specification. 
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income, non labour income, renting and owning a home with a mortgage are all 
positively associated with debt. Household characteristics, which are inversely related to 
debt, include household wealth and home ownership without a mortgage. These findings 
generally tie in with the results found in the existing literature, see Brown and Taylor 
(2008), Crook (2001) and Gropp et al. (1997).14
In Tables 2 (PSID) and 3 (SCF) Panel B, we replace the risk aversion index with 
binary indicators denoting the head of household’s response to the risk attitudes 
questions described in Section III, where the least risk averse category is the reference 
category, i.e. . Given that the intervals of potential income loss specified in the 
hypothetical gamble at 10%, 20%, 33%, 50% and 75% are somewhat irregular in the 
PSID risk preference measure, the dummy variable specification is particularly 
interesting for this dataset. It is apparent that there is a monotonic relationship, where 
statistically significant, between the level of risk aversion and household debt for both 
the PSID and the SCF samples.
0htRA =
15 Clearly, throughout each panel and data set, the ρ  
parameter is statistically significant suggesting a degree of inter-dependence between 
financial assets and debt.16
Modelling Risk Preference 
                                                 
14 Arguably, an important omission from the empirical analysis thus far is the price of debt, i.e. the rate of 
interest, which potentially may influence both the level of debt and the effect that risk preference has on 
the level of debt. For the SCF, we have information in each year on the average interest rate households 
pay for outstanding debt. The results presented for the SCF are robust to the inclusion of this additional 
covariate. Although this information is not available in the PSID it should be noted, however, that year 
dummy variables, which arguably may capture the effect of interest rates, are included throughout the 
empirical analysis. 
15 Testing across the models in panels A and B reveals no significant difference in terms of model 
performance between using the risk preference index versus the set of binary indicators. 
16 Using a nested tobit estimator as an alternative specification, whereby we condition on households 
reporting a strictly positive level of financial assets, i.e. the interior solution case depicted by equations 
(10) and (11) in the theoretical analysis, we find that the magnitude of the association between risk 
preference and household debt is similar to that found from the bivariate tobit specifications. Similarly, the 
inverse association between risk aversion and the level of unsecured debt is confirmed with a univariate 
debt equation. Full results are available on request. 
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From a policy-maker’s perspective, it is important to ascertain the determinants of debt 
at the household level in order to evaluate the potential financial pressure that 
households may experience following, for example, a deterioration in their financial 
situation. Evidence of a link between risk preference and the level of unsecured debt 
may inform policy-makers of the determinants of household debt, but the natural 
question arises as to what factors influence risk preference. Hence, we estimate a risk 
aversion equation as an ordered probit model as follows: 
' 'ht ht ht htRA X Zλ φ= + +ν            (28) 
We model risk preference conditional upon the control variables used to model debt, 
htX , see above, which importantly contains information relating to income and wealth, 
plus an additional set of explanatory variables, htZ , which act as over-identifying 
instruments. The over-identifying instruments, which are discussed in detail below, 
differ across the two data sets, due to data availability. We then re-estimate our pooled 
bivariate tobit models replacing htRA  with a value purged from identifiable influences, 
defined as ˆhtν , i.e. the residual from equation (28), in order to ascertain whether a 
relationship remains between debt and risk preference. 
 Table 4, column 1, presents the results from the SCF of estimating the risk 
preference model, i.e. equation (28). The over-identifying instruments used to model 
risk preference, htZ , include: expectations about the performance of the U.S. economy 
and interest rates over the next five years; reasons for saving (future major expenses in 
the next 10 years, illness, rainy day or to enjoy life); attitudes towards credit (i.e. does 
the respondent think it is good or bad); and whether the respondent was suspicious about 
the study before the interview (which may be correlated with unobserved personality 
traits). We present the marginal effects associated with being in the most risk averse 
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category (where around 30% of heads of household lie). The factors, which positively 
influence the probability of being in this category, i.e. the most risk averse category, 
include: reasons for saving; expectations about the future of the economy; and being 
suspicious about the interview. Negative influences on the probability of being in the 
most risk averse category are: whether major expenses are expected in the future; 
whether he/she plans to save for the future; the natural logarithm of the amount he/she 
expects to inherit; attitudes towards credit; and having life insurance.  
We replicate the results for the PSID, where although a Risk Aversion Section is 
only included in the 1996 PSID, over the period 1969 to 1972, an index of risk 
avoidance is available in four waves of the PSID, which we include in the set of over-
identifying instruments. This is derived from questions relating to the head of 
household’s actual behaviour relating to seat belt usage, smoking and purchases of 
medical insurance and car insurance. It is possible that individuals are in the sample 
between 1 to 4 times during the period 1969 to 1972. Hence, we take an average of the 
risk avoidance index, which is increasing in risk aversion, over a maximum of four years 
as our early measure of risk preference: 19721969−=Tr . In terms of modelling risk 
preference in 1996 using the PSID, the controls we include in htZ  are: the early risk 
preference measure, i.e. 19721969−=Tr , recoding missing values to the midpoint category; a 
control for whether the head of household was in the PSID during the period 1969-72; 
and the log of the expected pay-off of the gamble in the PSID. The log of the expected 
pay-off from the hypothetical gamble is calculated as follows: 
( ) (1 21 2 1 2hev p LY p LY= × + × )  where 1p  and 2p  denote the doubling or cutting of 
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family income, as indicated by htRA ,
15 and life time income is proxied by 
 where Y is household labour income in 1996 and the term in 
parenthesis denotes a proxy for the number of years the head of household has until 
retirement. The second column in Table 4 presents the results for the PSID focusing 
again on the marginal effects associated with being in the most risk averse category 
(around 34% of heads of household are in this category, which is similar to the SCF). 
Risk avoidance over 1969-72 is associated with a higher probability of being in the most 
risk averse category in 1996, where a one standard deviation increase in the early risk 
avoidance measure is associated with a 2.44 percentage point increase in the probability 
of being in the most risk averse category. Perhaps not surprisingly, a higher expected 
pay-off from the gamble is associated with a lower probability of being in the most risk 
averse category, where a one percent increase in the expected payoff is associated with 
approximately a 1 percentage point higher probability of being in the most risk averse 
category. 
(65LY Y age= × − )
Having eradicated the influence of observable characteristics, which potentially 
influence risk preference, for both data sets, we ascertain whether the inverse 
relationship between risk preference, ˆhtν , (now orthogonal to observables) and 
unsecured debt remains. This is explored in Table 5, Panels A and B for the PSID and 
SCF respectively.18 Across both data sets, the estimated marginal effect remains 
negative and statistically significant in the debt equation. A one standard deviation 
increase in ˆhtν  reduces the level of debt by around 11.34 (3.95) percentage points in the 
                                                 
15 To be specific:  if 0RA = , ( ) ( )= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.25ev LY LY ; if 1RA = , ( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.5ev LY LY )
)
; 
if , ; if 2RA = ( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.66ev LY LY 3RA = , ( ) ( )= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.8ev LY LY ; if , 
; finally, if 
4RA =
( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.9ev LY LY ) 5RA = , LYev = . 
18 The standard errors have been adjusted via bootstrapping to account for the inclusion of the generated 
risk preference variable in the debt and financial asset equations. 
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PSID (SCF), this is calculated from the marginal effects reported in Panel A (C) using 
the method described above. Hence, although the influence of risk preference is 
moderated once observable effects have been controlled for, a relatively large 
association between risk preference and the level of unsecured debt remains.19
 
V.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have contributed to the growing literature on debt accumulation at the 
household level focusing in particular on the role of risk preference in the decision to 
acquire unsecured debt. Given the uncertainty surrounding the decision to acquire debt, 
it is surprising that inter-personal differences in risk preferences have not attracted much 
attention in the empirical literature on household debt. Our theoretical analysis suggests 
that the optimal level of debt is a function of risk preference. Our empirical analysis has 
explored our theoretical priors by investigating the relationship between risk preference 
and debt accumulation using U.S. household level data drawn from the PSID and the 
SCF. Our empirical findings accord with our theoretical prediction that unsecured debt 
at the household level is influenced by risk preference. Furthermore, our empirical 
analysis suggests that risk aversion is inversely associated with the amount of unsecured 
debt accumulated at the household level.  
                                                 
19 In both the PSID and the SCF, the over-identifying instruments are jointly insignificant in the outcome 
equation and are jointly significant in the risk attitudes equation (at the 1% level) thereby endorsing the 
validity of our over-identifying instruments. Since the choice of over-identifying instruments is always 
open to debate, we have experimented with changes in the set of instruments and we find that our results 
are robust to such changes. 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 PSID SCF 
 MEAN STD DEV MEAN STD DEV
Log Debt  ( )ln htd 4.5032 4.22 4.4647 4.42
Log Financial Assets  ( )ln hta 6.4876 3.97 4.7761 5.09
Risk Aversion Index htRA  (0-5 PSID; 0-3 SCF) 3.1606 1.64 0.9576 0.87
Variables in htX   
Age 40 11.61 50 16.30
Age squared 1782 983.58 2822 1742.11
Male (0-1) 0.7556 0.42 0.7853 0.41
Non white (0-1) 0.4462 0.49 0.1929 0.39
Married (0-1) 0.6345 0.48 0.6151 0.49
Employed (0-1) 0.8266 0.38 0.7299 0.44
Spouse employed (0-1) 0.4889 0.50 0.3603 0.48
Owns a business (0-1) 0.1413 0.35 0.3228 0.47
Years of schooling (8-17) 13.2663 2.37 13.7129 2.99
Good health (0-1) 0.8965 0.30 0.9519 0.21
Household size (1+) 2.7091 1.46 2.6566 1.44
Log household labour income 9.7279 2.72 8.8248 4.52
Log household other income (i.e. non labour) 2.0598 3.19 3.7052 4.54
Log household wealth 9.5605 3.76 11.2606 3.66
Rented home (0-1) 0.2826 0.45 0.2594 0.44
Home ownership (with a mortgage) (0-1) 0.5428 0.50 0.4239 0.49
Home ownership (without a mortgage) (0-1) 0.1345 0.34 0.2558 0.44
Average interest rate – – 4.7761 5.09
Variables in htZ   
Expectations about the economy (0=worse – 2=better) – – 1.2065 0.73
Expectations about interest rates (0=worse – 2=better) – – 1.5982 0.62
Expect major expenses within 10 years (0-1) – – 0.5166 0.50
Plan to save (0=next few months – 4=longer than 10 years) – – 2.1863 1.34
Log amount of money he/she expects to inherit – – 1.6874 4.19
Save for a rainy day – unemployment (0-1) – – 0.0169 0.13
Save for rainy day – ill health (0-1) – – 0.0469 0.21
Save to a rainy day – other (0-1) – – 0.2859 0.45
Save to remain liquid (0-1) – – 0.0165 0.13
Save to enjoy life (0-1) – – 0.0042 0.06
Do not save (0-1) – – 0.1992 0.39
Attitude towards credit (0=bad idea – 2=good idea) – – 0.9846 0.81
Think credit should be paid off (0=hardly ever – 3=always) – – 1.9474 1.23
Have life insurance (0-1) – – 0.7351 0.44
Suspicious about interview (0=no – 2=very) – – 0.4757 0.64
Early risk preference 19721969−=Tr  (0=least – 6=most risk averse) 3.1844 1.37 – –
Log expected value of the gamble 13.2862 3.04 – –
  
OBSERVATIONS 14,329 123,070 
 TABLE 2: Simultaneous Modelling of Debt and Assets; Pooled Bivariate Tobit Models – PSID 
 LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
DEBT) 
LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
FINANCIAL ASSETS)
PANEL A: RISK AVERSION INDEX M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Head of household characteristics  
Age 0.0331 (2.01) -0.0030 (0.79)
Age squared -0.0007 (3.30) 0.0001 (1.36)
Male -0.4074 (5.01) 0.0335 (1.90)
Non white -0.6597 (9.14) -10.4043 (5.69)
Married 0.1701 (1.90) 0.1306 (6.21)
Employed 0.1177 (1.30) 0.0649 (3.14)
Spouse employed 0.3332 (4.32) 0.0228 (1.22)
Owns a business 0.0139 (0.17) 0.1108 (5.41)
Years of schooling 0.1644 (11.64) 0.0510 (16.45)
Good health -0.2678 (2.81) 0.1437 (7.02)
Household characteristics  
Household size -0.0490 (2.10) -0.0374 (6.91)
Log household labour income 0.1259 (9.92) 0.0495 (18.88)
Log household other income 0.0354 (3.35) -0.0007 (0.30)
Log household wealth -0.1165 (10.84) 0.0764 (2.13)
Rented home 0.3568 (2.79) 0.0044 (0.15)
Home ownership (with a mortgage) 0.6273 (5.21) 0.1594 (5.64)
Home ownership (without a mortgage) -0.3876 (3.13) 0.1158 (3.88)
Risk preference measures  
Risk aversion index -0.1059 (5.91) -0.0043 (1.06)
ρ 0.1269       (14.13) 
LR ( )2 44χ  65,760.37   p=[0.000] 
PANEL B: RISK AVERSION DUMMY VARIABLES M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk aversion index = 1 -0.1254 (0.96) -0.0343 (1.12)
Risk aversion index = 2 -0.0554 (0.44) 0.0044 (0.15)
Risk aversion index = 3 -0.1280 (1.72) 0.0011 (0.04)
Risk aversion index = 4 -0.2316 (1.89) -0.0033 (0.12)
Risk aversion index = 5 -0.5463 (4.61) -0.0365 (1.37)
ρ 0.1264       (14.05) 
LR  ( )2 52χ 65,751.77   p=[0.000] 
Left Censored 6,491 2,740 
OBSERVATIONS 14,329 
 
Notes: (i) year dummy variables are included; (ii) the omitted category of the risk aversion measure in Panel B is where the risk 
aversion index equals 0, i.e. the least risk averse category. 
 
TABLE 3: Simultaneous Modelling of Debt and Assets; Pooled Bivariate Tobit Models – SCF 
 LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
DEBT) 
LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
FINANCIAL ASSETS)
PANEL A: RISK AVERSION INDEX M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Head of household characteristics  
Age 0.0497 (11.47) 0.0503 (13.82)
Age squared -0.0009 (2.20) 0.0000 (1.59)
Male -0.2383 (6.88) 0.1213 (4.11)
Non white -0.0649 (2.24) -0.9997 (9.30)
Married 0.0291 (0.88) 0.5105 (7.99)
Employed 1.2121 (4.72) 0.4425 (4.30)
Spouse employed 0.8874 (2.79) -0.3450 (5.81)
Owns a business -0.9764 (4.54) 0.6565 (30.20)
Years of schooling 0.0760 (17.97) 0.3232 (6.30)
Good health -0.2016 (4.14) 0.3369 (7.36)
Household characteristics  
Household size 0.0149 (1.70) -0.0890 (12.20)
Log household labour income 0.0106 (3.18) 0.0182 (5.94)
Log household other income 0.0312 (10.37) -0.0156 (6.02)
Log household wealth -0.0894 (3.19) -0.3228 (8.70)
Rented home 0.2978 (6.11) -0.4937 (11.54)
Home ownership (with a mortgage) 0.9425 (2.27) -0.1136 (2.87)
Home ownership (without a mortgage) -0.9222 (9.45) 0.4308 (10.42)
Risk preference measures  
Risk aversion index -0.1338 (2.55) -0.0389 (4.30)
ρ 0.1578       (4.65) 
LR ( )2 44χ  49,480.70   p=[0.000] 
PANEL B: RISK AVERSION DUMMY VARIABLES M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk aversion index = 1 -0.0444 (0.94) -0.0676 (3.73)
Risk aversion index = 2 -0.0263 (1.95) 0.1231 (6.40)
Risk aversion index = 3 -0.2057 (4.38) -0.5867 (3.41)
ρ 0.1264       (14.05) 
LR ( )2 48χ  49,977.20   p=[0.000] 
Left Censored 58,354 58,707 
OBSERVATIONS 123,070 
 
Notes: (i) year dummy variables are included; (ii) the omitted category of the risk aversion measure in Panel B is where the risk 
aversion index equals 0, i.e. the least risk averse category. 
  
 
TABLE 4: Instrumented Risk Preference 
 
RISK AVERSION INDEX  
(SCF) 
RISK AVERSION INDEX 
(PSID) 
 
M.E.  
3=RA  TSTAT 
M.E. 
5=RA  TSTAT
Head of household characteristics   
Age 0.0025 (5.29) 0.0013 (2.77)
Age squared 0.0001 (4.16) 0.0004 (2.00)
Male -0.1281 (30.91) -0.0953 (9.33)
Non white 0.0295 (8.69) 0.0380 (4.45)
Married 0.0457 (12.39) 0.0352 (3.35)
Employed -0.0050 (1.27) 0.0312 (3.29)
Spouse employed 0.0176 (6.15) 0.0082 (0.89)
Owns a business -0.0813 (29.56) -0.0559 (5.94)
Years of schooling -0.0251 (48.70) -0.0138 (8.49)
Good health -0.0248 (15.23) 0.0151 (1.32)
Expectations about the economy 0.0069 (3.16) – – 
Expectations about interest rates -0.0087 (3.32) – – 
Expect major expenses within 10 years -0.0326 (13.25) – – 
Plan to save -0.0169 (17.70) – – 
Log amount of money expects to inherit -0.0023 (8.33) – – 
Save for a rainy day – unemployment 0.0350 (3.74) – – 
Save for rainy day – ill Health 0.0579 (9.20) – – 
Save to a rainy day – other 0.0144 (5.54) – – 
Save to remain liquid 0.0033 (0.36) – – 
Save to enjoy life -0.0341 (2.06) – – 
Do not save -0.0478 (14.08) – – 
Attitude towards credit -0.0193 (13.50) – – 
Think credit should be paid off -0.0254 (20.07) – – 
Have life insurance -0.0314 (10.45) – – 
Suspicious about interview 0.0310 (15.73) – – 
Early risk preference 19721969−=Tr  – – 0.0178 (5.97)
Log expected value of the gamble – – -0.0077 (4.63)
Household characteristics    
Household size 0.0138 (13.41) 0.0007 (0.27)
Log household labour income -0.0039 (9.87) 0.0008 (0.06)
Log household other income 0.0003 (1.01) -0.0034 (3.09)
Log household wealth -0.0147 (47.54) 0.0003 (0.34)
Rented home -0.0187 (3.41) -0.0409 (2.34)
Home ownership (with mortgage) -0.0644 (12.37) -0.0299 (0.17)
Home ownership (without mortgage) -0.0294 (5.47) 0.0803 (3.81)
LR  ( )2 dχ 37,051.81  p=[0.000] 1004.72  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 123,070 14,329 
Notes: (i) year dummy variables are included; (ii) a control for whether the head of household is in the sample during 1969-72 is 
also included as a covariate in the risk preference equation for the PSID; (iii) for the SCF (PSID) d=36 (24).  
  
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Simultaneous Modelling of Debt and Assets – Instrumented Risk Preference 
PANEL A: PSID INSTRUMENTED RISK PREFERENCE – BIVARIATE TOBIT 
Dependent Variable =  LOG (HOUSEHOLD DEBT) 
LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
FINANCIAL ASSETS) 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Unobserved risk preference ˆhtν  -0.0636 (4.01) -0.0047 (1.24) 
ρ  0.1278 (4.23) 
LR ( )2 44χ  65,769.21  p=[0.000] 
Left Censored  6,491 2,740 
OBSERVATIONS 14,329 
PANEL B:  SCF INSTRUMENTED RISK PREFERENCE – BIVARIATE TOBIT 
Dependent Variable =  
LOG (HOUSEHOLD DEBT) 
LOG (HOUSEHOLD 
FINANCIAL ASSETS) 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Unobserved risk preference ˆhtν  -0.0489 (10.24) 0.0254 (2.33) 
ρ  0.1562 (4.24) 
LR ( )2 44χ  49,560.01  p=[0.000] 
Left Censored  58,354 58,707 
OBSERVATIONS 123,070 
 Notes: (i) year dummy variables are included; (ii) T Statistics are based on bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 Figure 1A: Distribution of Log Debt over Time – ( )ln 0htd >  PSID  
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Figure 1B: Distribution of Log Debt over Time – ( )ln 0htd >  SCF 
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